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SESSION 3: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
MODERATOR: Emilio J. Cdrdenas*
QUESTION: I wonder whether local items can really throw
some light on what the focus of legislation ought to be, espe-
cially for countries that are just developing environmental legis-
lation. I am speaking of the distinction between process and re-
sult. By result I mean legislation, and by process, I mean regula-
tion of industrial activity generally. What kind of emphasis do
you think a country that is just developing its own regulations
now should look out for especially in the comparative experi-
ence of developed jurisdictions? I just want a common sense of
where we should be looking, is it process or result?
MR ADAMS: I first want to make a distinction between min-
ing and processing. The reason I want to make that distinction
is that every mine site is different in a way that every oil refinery
or aluminum smelter or copper smelter or steel rolling mill is
not.
If you go to a steel mill, it looks pretty much like any other
steel mill around the world. If you go to a mine, it differs from
other mines. A mine in a desert in Arizona has a completely
different environmental service as compared to a mine in a trop-
ical country or a mine in the arctic, and so on.
So I do think in mining there is no choice. The regulation
has to be about outcomes and not about methods. I think it is
reasonable for a developing country to seek outcomes that as a
starting point are the outcomes that we seek in the advanced
industrial countries, but with the proviso that I think there
should be an intelligent test of cost efficiency. It may be possible
to have a somewhat lesser desirable outcome if the thing is subtly
prohibitive. If getting from 90% to 99% is prohibitive, 90% is
preferable.
When we are talking about process industries and manufac-
turing industries and so on, I think then that the argument is
much better couched in terms of methods because capital is a
fungible international resource. If we know how to make cop-
per, for example, and capture 90% of it in the United States, we
know how to capture 99% in sovereign Russia, and 99% in sover-
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eign China, and it really is a capital issue. The environmental
compliance at the mining level can be radically different.
If you try to impose a particular Arizona environmental reg-
ulation in Nigeria, you might find a very bizarre result in terms
of a factor of ten or fifteen times more expensive. That would
not be the case with capital.
So I think the real difficulty is the nature of mining. I don't
know whether that is the same in oil. It may very well be, off-
shore may be quite different from onshore, and so on. But the
North Sea may be very different from the Gulf of Mexico.
MS. KING: From a financial viewpoint, environmental regu-
lation is not bad and I don't think the developing countries
should be afraid in imposing them. They will not turn away in-
vestors or companies from their country.
What is bad, and the industrial countries excel in that too, is
the unpredictability and the inconsistency of deregulation. As a
result, midway through a project the regulation is eliminated for
the project next door or it is altered somewhere else, which kills
not only the project but the name of the country as well.
As I said, what really kills the project or the name of the
country is when you go in and you hear this and then midway
through the investment process, the rules are completely
changed and that is it.
MR. ADAMS: I want to clear up one point about elephant
projects. I didn't use that project in an environmental context, I
used in an economics context; the elephant project burying the
one that has an intramarginal rate of return. Elephant projects
may not be environmentally huge. I mean, the mineral deposit,
if it is very, very rich may have a lesser environmental impact to
actually extract it because the grade of the deposit is so much
higher. Thus, it should not be an environmental issue, the af-
fordability of the elephant project is very great, and it can afford
probably to comply with the very best international standards the
technology provides. In my view it should in that case and I sus-
pect that that is also the view of all the mining companies any-
way. No one wants these problems.
The issues of affordability, I think, more applies to more
marginal projects and it also applies to the question of cleaning
up facilities that have already been constructed. For example, in
central Africa, virtually none of the copper smelters have envi-
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ronmental controls. They should, but whether they need the bil-
lion dollar solution that we have in Utah or whether they could
get by on perhaps capturing 80% or 90% of the sulphur for a
hundred million is very, I think and intelligent question to an-
swer and probably a more reasonable one.
